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c.3 


North  Carolina  on  the  eve  of  secession 


Th< 


Howell  Collection 


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Presented  by  Kay  Kyser 

And  his  Mother 

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i 897-193 i 

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THE   UNIVERSITY 

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NORTH   CAROLINA 
)9T0.7I         LIBRARY 

c.3 


NORTH  CAROLINA  ON 'THE  EVE  OF 
SECESSION 


BY  '■« 

% 

WILLIAM  K.  BOYD 


Reprinted  from  the  Annual.  Report  of  the  American  Historical  Association 
for  1910,  pages  165-177 


WASHINGTON 
1912 


NORTH  CAROLINA  ON  THE  EVE  OF 
SECESSION 


BY 


WILLIAM  K.  BOYD 


Reprinted  from  the  Annual  Report  of  the  American  Historical  Association 
for  1910,  pages  165-177 


^ 


WASHINGTON" 

1312 


X,  NORTH  CAROLINA  ON  THE  EVE  OF  SECESSION. 


By  WILLIAM  K.  BOYD, 

Professor  of  History  in  Trinity  College,  Durham,  N.  C. 


165 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 
in  2013 


http://archive.org/details/northcarolinaoneOOboyd 


NORTH  CAROLINA  ON  THE  EVE  OF  SECESSION. 


By  William  K.  Boyd. 


In  the  great  drama  of  1860-61  North  Carolina  had  no  leading 
part  like  that  of  South  Carolina  or  the  far  South.  The  last  State 
except  one  to  ratify  the  Federal  Constitution  in  1789,  it  was  also  the 
last  except  one  to  join  the  Confederacy.  But  a  study  of  conditions 
within  its  borders  on  the  eve  of  secession  has  a  value  far  greater 
than  this  relative  place  in  the  movement  might  suggest.  In  fact, 
North  Carolina  illustrates  some  phases  of  southern  life  too  often 
lost  sight  of  in  discussions  of  sectional  issues.  To  what  extent  these 
conditions  existed  elsewhere  and  their  place  in  the  history  of  secession 
are  worthy  of  inquiry,  for  southern  society  before  1860  did  not 
conform  to  one  type  of  thought  or  action.  Secession  itself  was  the 
result  of  years  of  conflict  on  the  hustings,  in  the  press,  and  in  economic 
development. 

The  first  of  the  forces  which  shaped  the  attitude  of  North  Carolina 
toward  secession  was  its  social  structure.  In  early  days  the  colony 
was  a  refuge  for  men  of  small  means  who  sought  to  improve  their 
fortunes,  and  in  1860  the  small  planter  was  still  the  chief  factor  in 
industrial  life. 

There  was  also  a  distinct  lack  of  unity  in  feeling  or  action  among 
the  people;  rarely  indeed  did  they  rally  as  one  man  in  any  common 
cause.  This  was  due  in  part  to  diversity  of  racial  origins,  but  much 
more  to  sectional  influences.  River  courses  and  natural  elevations 
of  the  land  produced  geographical  divisions  so  distinct  that  inter- 
course between  them  was  exceedingly  difficult,  and  the  cities  of 
South  Carolina  and  Virginia  were  for  years  more  important  com- 
mercial centers  for  North  Carolina  than  the  towns  within  the  State. 
This  sectionalism  of  nature  had  also  a  political  character.  Up  to 
1835  the  counties  east  of  Raleigh,  by  virtue  of  their  number,  held 
the  balance  of  power  in  the  legislature,  while  those  to  the  west  had 
greater  resources  and  grew  more  rapidly  in  population.  Long  after 
reforms  in  representation  were  made  the  sectional  feeling  continued 
and  was  a  potent  influence  in  politics. 

Interacting  with  sectionalism  was  the  industrial  organization. 
The  slave  system  and  its  attendant  products  were  never  extensively 

167 


168  AMERICAN   HISTORICAL  ASSOCIATION. 

developed  except  in  a  group  of  middle  eastern  counties.  In  fact,  less 
than  28  per  cent  of  the  families  in  1860  held  slaves,  while  the  average 
number  of  slaves  held  was  9.6.  In  strong  contrast  to  the  slave-owning 
class  were  the  nonslaveholders.  Their  industries  included,  besides  agri- 
culture, two  classes  of  manufacturing:  One,  factories  in  which  North 
Carolina  ranked  next  to  Virginia  and  Georgia;  the  other,  domestic 
arts  and  hand  trades.  These  latter  industries  were  important 
because  they  enabled  each  plantation  or  community  to  be  in  a  large 
degree  economically  self-sufficient.  The  story  of  the  vast  number 
of  nonslaveholding  whites  in  the  South,  their  origin,  occupations, 
opinions,  and  influence,  is  as  yet  unwritten.  In  North  Carolina  they 
always  had  a  considerable  influence,  and  by  1860  their  protest  against 
certain  inequalities  produced  by  the  slave  system  was  well  under  way. 
Their  attitude  toward  secession  has  been  well  stated  in  the  words  of 
Senator  Vance:  "Seven-tenths  of  our  people  owned  no  slaves  at  all, 
and  to  say  the  least  of  it,  felt  no  great  and  enduring  enthusiasm  for 
its  [slavery's]  preservation,  especially  when  it  seemed  to  them  that 
it  was  in  no  danger."1 

These  underlying  social  conditions — the  prevalence  of  men  of 
moderate  means,  sectional  influences,  and  the  existence  of  a  large 
nonslaveholding  class — were  the  basis  for  certain  well-defined  political 
characteristics.  There  was  a  variety  of  opinion  on  every  public 
question,  and  conservatism  was  usually  nothing  more  than  a  failure 
to  unite  on  one  common  opinion  or  program  of  progress.  There  was 
also  a  prejudice  against  ideas  or  movements  of  alien  origin,  which 
along  with  isolation  gave  rise  to  provincialism. 

The  attitude  toward  Federal  relations  was  accordingly  strongly 
particularistic.  Expediency  rather  than  patriotism  or  a  national 
ideal  caused  the  ratification  of  the  Federal  Constitution  in  1789,  and 
strong  States-rights  views  predominated  among  all  parties  and 
leaders  of  the  early  days.  Federalism  itself  was  very  conservative 
toward  the  growth  of  national  powers.  Its  leaders  looked  to  Madison 
rather  than  to  Hamilton  in  organizing  the  machinery  of  the  central 
Government.  Dissatisfied  with  the  proposed  assumption  of  State 
debts  by  the  Federal  Government,  the  lower  house  of  the  legislature, 
in  1790,  refused  to  take  the  oath  to  support  the  Constitution  which 
had  been  prescribed  by  Congress.  In  the  same  year  the  State 
court  of  equity  refused  to  obey  a  writ  of  certiorari,  calling  a  case 
before  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,  and  the  legislature 
passed  a  vote  of  thanks  to  the  judges.2  Also,  the  first  States-rights 
opinion  emanating  from  the  Supreme  Court  was  that  of  Iredell,  a 
North  Carolina  Federalist,  in  the  case  of  Chisholm  v.  Georgia.     But 


1  Quoted  from  J.  A.  Sloan,  "North  Carolina  in  the  war  between  the  States,"  105. 
2 See  H.  M.  WagstafE,  "State  rights  and  political  parties  in  North  Carolina"  (Johns  Hopkins  Studies, 
Series  XXIV),  32-33. 


NOETH   CAKOLINA  ON   THE  EVE   OF   SECESSION.  169 

at  the  crisis  raised  by  the  alien  and  sedition  laws,  a  fear  that  the  Union 
was  in  danger  and  a  desire  for  conciliation  prevailed  over  any  mani- 
festations of  political  theories.1 

The  nature  of  the  union  was  not  seriously  in  question  again  until 
the  controversy  over  the  tariff  and  nullification.  In  1827  the  leg- 
islature resolved  that  any  increase  in  the  tariff  was  inexpedient  and 
that  "whenever  a  system  is  adopted  by  the  General  Government 
which  does  not  equally  conserve  the  interests  of  all,  then  the  right 
rests  with  any  State  or  States  to  question  whether  the  benefits  of 
,the  union  are  not  more  than  counterbalanced  by  its  evils."  This 
manifesto  against  the  tariff  was  of  course  ineffectual,  and  by  1830 
it  was  evident  that  South  Carolina  would  attempt  nullification. 
The  people  at  large  were  unprepared  to  indorse  such  a  radical  measure 
and  censured  it  in  many  public  meetings.  But  in  the  legislature 
of  1830  a  strong  States-rights  faction  dominated  the  senate  and 
rejected  resolutions  condemning  nullification  which  had  passed  the 
house.  Two  years  later,  in  1832,  as  a  compromise,  both  the  tariff 
and  nullification  were  formally  censured  by  the  legislature  as  uncon- 
stitutional.2 This  action  on  nullification  is  significant  for  two 
reasons:  First,  Nathaniel  Macon,  for  years  the  leader  of  the  old 
Jeffersonian  Democracy,  in  a  letter  to  a  friend  definitely  expressed 
his  belief  in  the  right  of  secession.  "I  have  never  believed  a  State 
could  nullify  and  stay  in  the  Union,"  he  said,  "but  have  always 
believed  that  a  State  might  secede  when  she  pleased,  provided  she 
would  pay  her  proportion  of  the  public  debt;  and  this  right  I  have 
considered  the  best  safeguard  to  public  liberty  and  to  public  justice 
that  could  be  desired." 3  The  nullification  debates  are  also  interest- 
ing because  those  who  sympathized  with  South  Carolina  in  1832  and 
lived  until  1860  favored  secession. 

In  strong  contrast  to  the  particularistic  spirit  of  the  early  days 
were  the  policies  of  the  Whig  party,  which  controlled  the  State 
administration  from  1836  to  1850.  Nowhere  did  the  old-line  Whigs 
of  the  South  leave  a  finer  record  than  in  North  Carolina.  Broad, 
constructive  ideas  and  cooperation  with  the  ideals  of  other  sections 
of  the  country  characterized  their  leaders.  Public  schools  and 
State  aid  to  railways  at  home,  the  recharter  of  the  second  bank  of  the 
United  States,  internal  improvements,  and  a  protective  tariff  by 
the  Federal  Government  were  typical  measures  advocated  by  the 
party.  While  there  were  strong  States-rights  elements  in  its  mem- 
bership, its  most  influential  leaders  regarded  the  Federal  Constitu- 
tion as  something  more  than  a  compact  among  States — rather  as 
the  charter  of  an  indestructible  union,  by  which  the  American 
people  were  to  be  guided  through  all  time.     The  rise  of  this  new 

1  Wagstaft  op.  cit.,  36-37.  2  Wagstaff,  op.  cit.,  49-54.  *  W.  E.  Dodd,  "Life  of  Macon/'  385. 


170  AMERICAN   HISTORICAL  ASSOCIATION". 

party  coincided  with  local  sectional  conditions.  In  contrast  to  the 
cotton  States  the  Whigs  were  most  popular  in  the  counties  where  slav- 
ery and  its  industries  did  not  predominate;  these  included  the  western 
part  of  the  State,  a  portion  of  the  central  region,  and  the  marshy 
swamp  country  along  the  coast.  The  reason  for  this  popularity 
was  the  Whig  program  of  progress,  these  sections  needing  internal 
improvements  by  State  aid.  The  strength  of  the  Democrats,  on  the 
other  hand,  lay  in  those  counties  where  slavery,  cotton,  and  tobacco 
produced  a  settled,  unchanging  economic  svstem.  It  was  therefore 
good  policy  for  each  party  to  choose  its  candidates  in  State  cam- 
paigns from  the  section  in  which  it  was  numerically  the  weaker. 
Thus  an  eastern  Whig  was  often  nominated  for  governor  to  oppose 
a  western  Democrat.  The  custom  passed  over  to  the  slavery  de- 
bates, the  proslavery  leadership  in  the  legislature  being  frequently 
given  to  a  western  Democrat. 

Such  were  the  underlying  social  and  political  conditions  in  North 
Carolina  when  the  national  controversy  over  slavery  extension  was 
revived,  after  the  Mexican  war.  Just  at  that  time  the  supremacy 
of  the  Whigs  began  to  wane.  In  that  decline  the  slavery  issue  was 
an  important  factor,  for  it  caused  a  serious  division  of  opinion. 
In  the  legislature  of  1848-49  W.  L.  Steele,  a  Whig  from  the  South 
Carolina  line,  introduced  resolutions  in  the  lower  house  to  the  effect 
that  the  Territories  belonged  to  the  States;  that  the  General  Govern- 
ment as  the  agent  of  the  States  could  make  no  laws  destructive  of 
the  equal  rights  of  the  States  in  the  Territories;  and  that  to  deprive 
a  citizen  of  his  right  to  emigrate  with  his  slaves  would  be  unconstitu- 
tional. These  were  almost  identical  with  resolutions  which  Calhoun 
had  introduced  in  the  Senate  of  the  United  States.1  They  at  once 
aroused  much  discussion,  which  extended  beyond  legislative  halls. 
Mr.  Badger,  the  ablest  constitutional  lawyer  among  the  Whigs, 
had  previously  declared  that  Congress  had  full  jurisdiction  over 
slavery  in  the  Territories.  Mr.  Clingman,  Whig  Congressman  from 
the  mountain  district,  was  now  appealed  to  by  members  of  the 
legislature  and  replied  that  the  Wilmot  proviso  was  a  violation  of 
the  Constitution  which  would  justify  resistance  by  all  means  in  the 
power  of  the  South.2  In  the  end  the  conservative  influence  was 
strong  enough  to  force  through  substitute  resolutions,  which  ad- 
mitted the  main  contention,  but  suggested  that  the  Missouri  com- 
promise line  be  extended  into  the  Territories  acquired  from  Mexico 
to  settle  existing  controversies,  and  deprecated  any  attempt  to 
dissolve  the  Union.3 

i  House  Journal  (North  Carolina),  Nov.  27;  Raleigh  Standard,  Nov.  27, 1848. 

2  Raleigh  Register,  Feb.  3, 1849.    See  also  Clingman's  letter  to  Foote,  Speeches  and  Writings  of  T.  L. 
Clingman,  p.  231. 
a  Laws  of  North  Carolina,  1848-49,  p.  237. 


NORTH   CAROLINA  ON   THE  EVE   OF   SECESSION.  171 

Thus  in  1848-49  a  cleavage  was  begun  among  the  Whigs  on  the 
subject  of  slavery.  The  next  year  the  Democrats  carried  the  State 
elections  on  the  issue  of  manhood  suffrage  in  the  choice  of  State 
senators.  On  the  Democracy  lay  the  duty  of  shaping  the  State's 
policy  toward  the  slavery  problem.  The  compromise  of  1850  had 
just  been  passed  when  the  legislature  met  in  November.  The  aboli- 
tionists of  the  North  were  lifting  their  voices  against  the  fugitive- 
slave  law,  while  the  radicals  at  the  South  proposed  to  repudiate  the 
entire  compromise  even  at  the  cost  of  secession.  A  joint  committee  on 
slavery  was  appointed.  Its  report  advised  acquiescence  in  the  com- 
promise of  1850,  but  retaliation  in  the  future  if  slavery  in  the  District 
of  Columbia  or  the  interstate  slave  trade  were  restricted,  the  fugitive- 
slave  law  changed,  or  a  slave  State  refused  admission  to  the  Union, 
and  recommended  an  ad  valorem  tax  on  merchandise  imported  from 
the  nonslaveholding  States  to  offset  the  agitation  against  the  fugitive- 
slave  law.  The  minority  of  the  committee  recommended  a  mani- 
festo defending  the  right  of  secession,  to  be  added  to  these  resolutions.1 
The  center  of  debate  on  these  reports  was  the  senate,,  for  there  the 
margin  between  the  Whigs  and  Democrats  was  very  small.  In  the 
end  resolves  of  the  minority,  looking  toward  secession,  were  rejected 
and  those  of  the  majority  were  considerably  revised  in  .the  interest 
of  conservatism.2  This  was  due  to  a  division  among  the  Democrats, 
a  sane,  sensible  group  joining  with  the  Whigs  to  adopt  the  revised 
resolutions.3  As  radicalism  was  checked  in  the  senate  the  fight  in 
the  house  was  dropped.  Thus  early  was  the  Democracy,  as  well  as 
Whiggery,  divided  iDto  radical  and  conservative  factions. 

The  right  of  secession,  rejected  in  the  legislature,  was  presented  to 
the  people  in  the  congressional  campaigns  of  1851.  In  the  third 
district  George  W.  Caldwell,  Democrat,  elaborated  and  defended  the 
right  of  withdrawal  from  the  Union,  while  his  Whig  opponent, 
Alfred  Dockery,  went  so  far  as  to  declare  that  if  South  Carolina  or 
even  North  Carolina  should  attempt  secession  he  would  vote  for  an 
appropriation  to  keep  the  offending  State  within  the  Union.4  Like- 
wise, in  the  eighth  district,  Edward  Stanley  tock  a  similarposition 
while  opposing  Thomas  Ruffin,  a  secession  Democrat.5  In  the 
mountain  district  Clingnian,  a  Whig  with  a  secession  bias,  was 
opposed  by  B.  S.  Gaither,  a  Union  Whig,  and  made  conciliatory 
explanations  of  his  previous  radical  speeches.     The  result  was  that 

i  House  Docs.  54  and  55  in  North  Carolina  legislature.    Doc.  of  1850-51. 

2  Standard,  Jan.  15,  proceedings  of  the  legislature,  and  Senate  doc.  95  in  North  Carolina  Leg  Docs,  of 
1850-51. 

3  It  is  Interesting  to  note  that  the  leader  <rf  the  conservative  Democrats  was  W.  N.  Edwards,  speaker 
of  the  senate,  and,  in  1861,  president  of  the  secession  convention. 

*  Standard,  June  28  and  July  5, 1851. 

*  Standard,  July  16, 1851. 


172  AMERICAN"   HISTORICAL  ASSOCIATION. 

the  Whigs,  although  they  had  lost  the  State  elections  of  the  previous 
year,  carried  five  of  the  nine  congressional  districts.1 

Thus  secession  as  a  remedy  for  the  South  was  repudiated  in  the 
legislature  and  rebuked  by  the  people.  But  a  strong,  active  State- 
rights  minority  had  appeared  during  the  controversy.  Its  leaders 
were  ready  to  insist  at  all  times  on  the  full  southern  position  in  regard 
to  slavery  and  to  recommend  secession  as  a  right,  if  not  a  practical 
remedy.  The  story  of  secession  in  North  Carolina  is  really  the  process 
by  which  this  minority  kept  its  idea  before,  the  public  and  by  which 
the  logic  of  events  reenforced  argument  until  an  inevitable  choice 
between  the  Union  or  the  Confederacy  was  forced  upon  the  people 
in  1861. 

The  radical  spirit  next  asserted  itself  during  the  controversy  over 
the  Kansas-Nebraska  bill.  Equal  rights  in  the  Union  or  independence 
out  of  it  was  the  ultimatum  of  the  Raleigh  Standard,  the  leading 
Democratic  journal;  but  radical  resolutions  in  the  legislature  of  1854 
were  defeated.2  In  the  campaign  of  1856,  however,  the  extremists 
made  considerable  headway  in  popular  agitation.  The  Standard 
declared  that  the  Union  could  not  survive  the  election  of  Fremont, 
and  Clingman,  who  had  left  the  Whig  Party  in  1852,  advised  resistance 
in  the  case  of  a  Republican  victory.3  To  what  extent  public  feeling 
was  aroused  is  well  illustrated  by  the  case  of  Prof.  Benjamin  Hedrick, 
of  the  State  University.  A  North  Carolinian,  a  graduate  of  the 
university,  he  had  studied  at  Harvard,  and  had  returned  to  his  alma 
mater  as  professor  of  chemistry.  His  early  impressions  of  the  evils 
of  slavery  were  strengthened  by  Ins  residence  in  the  North.  During 
the  presidential  campaign  he  stated,  in  reply  to  a  direct  question, 
that  he  expected  to  vote  for  Fremont.  This  information  spread 
from  the  college  community  to  the  newspapers.  The  Raleigh  Stand- 
ard declared  that  the  schools  of  the  State  should  be  purged  of  black 
Republicans.  Against  advice,  Prof.  Hedrick  published  a  statement 
of  his  antislaver}7-  views.  Thereupon  the  students  burned  him  in 
effigy,  the  faculty  passed  resolutions  repudiating  the  heresy  among 
them,  and  the  executive  committee  of  the  trustees  met  and  declared 
his  power  of  service  at  an  end.  As  Mr.  Hedrick  did  not  resign,  and 
the  attacks  in  the  newspapers  continued,  the  executive  committee 
in  a  second  meeting  declared  his  chair  vacant.  A  few  days  later 
Prof.  Hedrick  visited  Salisbury  to  attend  an  educational  convention. 
His  presence  became  known;  a  mob  collected,  burned  his  effigy 
before  his  eyes,  and  forced  him  to  leave  town.4 

1  The  districts  carried  were  the  second,  third,  fourth,  eighth,  and  ninth. 

2  Standard,  Nov.  15, 1854;  House  Journal,  1853-54,  pp.  59,  290. 
s  Standard,  Oct.  4;  Fayetteville  Observer,  Oct.  18, 1856. 

4  For  a  biographical  sketch  of  Mr.  Hedrick  see  J.  S.  Bassett,  "Antislavery  leaders  of  North  Carolina." 
(Johns  Hopkins  Studies,  Ser.  XVI,  no.  6).  The  documents  bearing  on  his  relations  with  the  university 
may  be  found  in  the  James  Sprunt  Historical  Publication  for  Jauuary,  1911. 


NORTH   CAROLINA  ON"   THE  EVE   OF   SECESSION.  173 

While  the  excitement  over  Prof.  Hedrick  was  at  its  height,  another 
event  atracted  the  attention  of  the  public.  This  was  the  visit  of 
Gov.  Wise,  of  Virginia,  and  Gov.  Adams,  of  South  Carolina,  to  Raleigh 
on  October  13.  Gov.  Jenkins,  of  Georgia,  was  expected  but  did  not 
come.  The  aim  of  this  meeting  of  governors  was  officially  announced 
to  be  a  visit  to  the  State  fair;  but  the  gentlemen  left  Raleigh  before 
the  fair  opened.  According  to  well-established  tradition  they  were 
invited  to  North  Carolina  to  consult  with  Gov.  Bragg  about  plans 
for  action  in  case  Fremont  was  elected.  What  agreement,  if  any, 
was  reached  is  not  known.  The  irony  of  history  is  that  Fremont, 
the  persona  non  grata  in  all  this  excitement,  had  been  mentioned  as  a 
presidential  possibility  for  the  Democracy  in  1855  by  F.  P.  Blair, 
who  suggested  that  a  Fremont  boom  be  launched  in  North  Carolina.1 

Three  years  later  the  radical  spirit  made  still  greater  headway 
among  the  people.  The  John  Brown  raid  at  Harpers  Ferry  aroused 
a  feeling  of  resistance.  The  existing  military  organizations  offered 
their  services  to  Gov.  Wise,  of  Virginia,  and  new  ones  were  formed. 
The  council  of  state,  the  advisory  body  of  the  governor,  adopted  reso- 
lutions which  threatened  secession  unless  slave  property  was  better 
protected.  The  radical  spirit  was  active  for  months  after  the  death 
of  Brown  in  the  arrest  of  suspected  abolitionists,  and  the  inspection 
of  the  mails  to  detect  antislavery  literature.  The  use  of  Helper's 
"  Impending  Crisis"  in  the  campaign  of  1860  made  the  book  ubiquitous 
in  North  Carolina  and  to  own  a  copy  was  virtually  a  political  crime.2 

But  slavery  and  State  rights  were  not  the  only  questions  before 
the  Democratic  Party  from  1850  to  1860,  and  no  discussion  of  seces- 
sion would  be  complete  without  mention  of  two  issues,  primarily 
domestic,  which  diverted  attention  from  the  national  slavery  contro- 
versy. First  of  these  was  that  of  public  lands  in  the  West.  In  1852 
Henry  Bennett,  of  New  York,  introduced  into  Congress  a  bill  which 
proposed  to  distribute  the  remaining  public  lands  among  the  States 
to  be  used  for  internal  improvements  and  other  local  needs.  This 
was  a  Whig  measure,  but  it  appealed  to  the  southern  Democrats  for 
two  reasons:  First,  it  allowed  the  slave  States  to  profit  by  the  western 
expansion  of  the  nation;  and  second,  the  proceeds  from  the  lands 
might  be  used  to  reduce  the  State  debts  incurred  by  the  construction 
of  railways  and  other  works  of  progress.  Consequently,  in  the  con- 
gressional election  of  1853  the  distribution  issue  was  raised  in  North 
Carolina  by  three  Democrats  who  bolted  party  lines.  In  the  third 
district  Duncan  McRae,  who  announced  himself  as  an  independent 
candidate  favoring  the  measure,  was  eliminated  by  an  appointment 
as  consul  to  Paris.  Immediately  his  place  was  taken  by  W.  F.  Leak, 
who  opposed  William  S.  Ashe,  the  regular  Democratic  nominee.     In 

«  Letter  of  Blair  to  Bedford  Brown,  of  North  Carolina.    Papers  of  the  Trinity  College  Historical  Society, 
Ser.  VI,  p.  86. 
2  Standard,  passim. 


174  AMERICAN   HISTORICAL-  ASSOCIATION. 

the  second  district  W.  C.  Loftin  adopted  distribution  and  opposed 
Thomas  Rufhn,  regular  Democrat.  In  both  these  districts  the  regular 
candidates  were  elected,  but  in  the  seventh  district,  where  a  large  Whig 
constituency7  existed,  the  division  of  Democrats  (A.  W.  Venable  favor- 
ing and  A.  M.  Lews  opposing  distribution),  enabled  the  Whigs  to 
elect  Sion  H.  Rogers.1  Later,  in  1858,  distribution  became  a  State- 
wide problem.  Mr.  McRae,  who  had  returned  from  Paris,  announced 
himself  as  independent  candidate  for  governor  on  the  issue.  The 
Whigs,  who  had  abandoned  their  party  organization  in  1856,  made  no 
nomination,  and  the  Raleigh  Register,  their  principal  organ,  advised 
all  Whigs  to  support  McRae  in  preference  to  Ellis,  the  Democratic 
candidate.  Mr.  McRae,  however,  failed  to  swing  the  Whig  vote,  and 
in  his  debates  with  Mr.  Ellis  he  was  outgeneraled,  and  so  he  was 
defeated  by  a  large  vote.2 

No  sooner  was  distribution  of  public  lands  disposed  of  than  another 
question  threatened  the  supremacy  of  the  Democratic  party.  This 
was  the  inequality  in  the  revenue  system.  By  the  constitution  of 
1835  slaves  were  taxed  as  polls  only,  with  the  exemption  of  all  under 
12  and  over  50.  The  unit  of  the  poll  tax  was  the  land  tax  on  300 
acres.  Two  inequalities  resulted:  First,  a  discrimination  against 
the  landholders,  for  the  landed  property  in  1859  was  valued  at  less 
than  the  slave  propert}r,  but  yielded  a  larger  revenue.  Thus  the 
men  of  small  means  were  not  encouraged  to  buy  land  or  increase 
their  real  estate.  The  second  discrimination  was  against  the  mechan- 
ics. Their  tools  and  implements  were  taxed  $10  per  thousand,  while 
on  the  mature  slave,  worth  at  least  SI, 000,  the  poll  tax  was  only  50 
cents.  Here  was  an  issue  winch  might  arraign  the  nonslaveholding 
class  against  the  slave  owners.  It  was  raised  in  1858  by  Moses  A. 
Bledsoe,  of  Raleigh,  who  introduced  a  resolution  in  the  State  senate 
looking  to  the  ad  valorem  taxation  of  all  property,  including  land 
and  slaves.  The  resolution  was  followed  by  bills  for  an  amendment 
to  the  constitution,  but  they  failed.  Defeated  in  the  legislature,  Mr. 
Bledsoe  turned  to  agitation.  He  organized  the  Raleigh  Working- 
men's  Association,  the  aim  of  which  was  to  secure  revenue  reform. 
As  the  strength  of  the  Democracy  lay  in  the  large  slaveholding  coun- 
ties, there  was  no  hope  for  ad  valorem  in  the  dominant  party.  But 
the  counties  where  slavery  was  not  the  exclusive  basis  of  industry 
had  always  been  Whig  by  tradition.     So  in  1860  the  Whigs  revived 

i  For  details  of  the  campaign  see  the  Raleigh  Standard  for  July  and  August,  1853.  Two  newspapers  sup- 
ported the  'ndependent  Democrats.  These  were  the  Democratic  Free  Press,  of  Wilmington,  and  the  North 
Carolina  Statesman,  of  Raleigh.  Edward  Cantwell  was  the  editor  of  the  latter,  and  was  perhaps  connected 
with  the  Wilmington  paper.    I  have  not  been  able  to  find  any  copies  of  either  paper. 

2  In  the  1858  campaign  W.  F.  Leake  announced  himself  an  independent  candidate  for  governor,  but 
withdrew  in  favor  of  McRae,  Wilmington  Journal,  Jan.  22, 1S58.  McRae's  letter  announcing  his  candidacy 
is  given  in  the  Standard,  Feb.  3,  1858.  During  the  campaign  McRae  and  Ellis  had  a  personal  encounter 
at  Beaufort.  An  interesting  phase  of  the  distribution  movement  was  the  argument  that  it  was  more  impor- 
tant than  the  slavery  issue,  Standard,  Jan.  27, 1858. 


NORTH    CAROLINA   ON    THE   EVE    OF    SECESSION.  175 

their  party  organization,  adopted  the  ad  valorem  issue,  and  nominated 
a  candidate  for  governor.  The  campaign  was  a  vigorous  one.  The 
friends  of  ad  valorem  had  the  better  of  the  argument,  but  two  influ- 
ences defeated  them.  One  was  their  failure  to  provide  for  the  exemp- 
tion of  any  property,  so  that  the  Democrats  claimed  that  tin  cups, 
crockery,  and  household  goods  would  be  taxed  in  detail,  and  thus 
ridiculed  the  ad  valorem  issue;  the  other  influence  against  the  Whigs 
was  the  strength  which  the  national  campaign  gave  the  Democracy. 
Democratic  defeat,  it  was  claimed,  would  weaken  the  unity  of  the 
South  at  the  time  of  greatest  peril.  But  the  majority  of  Ellis,  the 
Democratic  candidate,  in  August,  1860,  was  10,000  less  than  in  1858, 
though  the  vote  polled  was  unusually  large.  History  should  not  be 
made  the  basis  of  prophecy  of  what  might  have  been;  nevertheless 
one  can  not  but  see  in  the  ad  valorem  campaign  the  beginning  of  a 
revolt  against  slavery  as  a  political  and  an  economic  influence,  a 
movement  among  the  people  which  was  contemporary  with  the 
radicalism  of  Helper's  "Impending  Crisis."1 

While  the  issues  of  public  lands  and  ad  valorem  were  agitating  the 
Democracy,  a  serious  factional  cleavage  developed.  The  most  effec- 
tive leader  in  the  party  was  William  W.  Holden,  editor  of  the  Raleigh 
Standard.  To  him  more  than  any  other  one  man  was  due  the  su- 
premacy over  the  Whigs.  But  he  was  a  man  of  the  people  and  had 
little  in  common  with  the  more  aristocratic  leaders  of  his  party.  In 
1858  he  was  candidate  for  the  nomination  for  governor.  Undoubt- 
edly he  was  the  choice  of  the  rank  and  file,  but  in  the  party  conven- 
tion he  was  defeated  by  John  W.  Ellis,  a  representative  of  the  slave- 
holding  aristocracy.  Mr.  Holden  accepted  his  defeat  gracefully. 
But  soon  he  became  a  candidate  for  the  United  States  Senate.  Again 
he  was  defeated.  The  bitterness  of  this  personal  rivalry  spread  to 
the  rank  and  file,  and  there  were  intimations  of  the  organization  of  a 
new  party.  The  rupture  between  Mr.  Holden  and  the  other  leaders 
had  a  direct  bearing  on  the  secession  movement.  His  rivals  were 
men  of  extreme  States'  rights  views.  He  himself  had  openly  defended 
the  doctrine  of  secession.  But  from  1858  to  1860  his  radicalism 
became  less  pronounced,  and  after  the  Charleston  convention  he 
alhed  himself  with  the  conservative  members  of  his  party  and 
resisted  with  all  his  might  the  tide  of  secession.2 

Thus,  on  the  eve  of  the  presidential  election  of  1860,  the  supremacy 
of  the  Democratic  Party,  which  had  dominated  North  Carolina  for 
10  years,  was  threatened  by  factionalism,  by  the  rise  of  new  issues,, 
and  by  the  revival  of  the  Whig  organization.  The  presidential 
campaign  emphasized  another  serious  danger  to  the  party's  unity 
namely,  the  division  between  the  radical  States' -rights  Democrats, 

1  See  "Ad  valorem  slave  taxation  in  North  Carolina"  (Papers  of  the  Trinity  College  Historical  Society, 
series  V)  and  Wagstaff,  "State  rights  and  political  parties  in  North  Carolina,"  109-113.) 

2  See  "The  Democratic  convention  of  1858,"  in  Charlotte  Observer,  May  3, 1908. 


176  AMERICAN   HISTORICAL  ASSOCIATION". 

who  were  in  sympathy  with  the  influences  which  led  to  secession, 
and  the  Union  Democrats,  who  believed  in  the  constitutional  right 
of  secession,  but  opposed  its  application. 

The  first  event  which  revealed  this  phase  of  party  crisis  was  the 
Democratic  convention  at  Charleston.  The  North  Carolina  dele- 
gation, in  which  the  Union  Democrats  had  a  majority,  was  one  of 
the  determining  influences  in  that  historic  meeting.  It  was  the 
hope  of  Mr.  Yancey  and  his  followers  to  win  the  border  States  to 
their  program.  They  therefore  gave  the  chairmanship  of  the  com- 
mittee on  platform  to  W.  W.  Avery,  a  radical  States'-Rights  Demo- 
crat of  North  Carolina.  But  the  Union  delegates  refused  to  take 
any  part  officially  in  any  of  the  caucuses  held  by  the  cotton  States 
leaders.  When  the  debate  on  the  platform  was  held  the  delegation 
as  a  whole  was  in  sympathy  with  neither  the  northern  Democrats  nor 
those  of  the  far  South,  but  favored  simply  the  reaffirmation  of  the 
Cincinnati  platform  of  1856.  When  it  was  evident  that  the  minority 
platform  would  be  adopted,  the  protest  of  two  North  Carolina  dele- 
gates caused  the  rejection  of  a  clause  referring  the  question  of  slav- 
ery in  Territories  to  the  Supreme  Court.  When  the  report  as  a 
whole  was  finally  passed,  the  North  Carolinians  refused  to  follow 
the  cotton  States  in  withdrawing  from  the  convention.  This  action 
preserved  the  party  organization,  for,  if  North  Carolina  had  with- 
drawn, Virginia,  Tennessee,  and  the  border  States  would  have  fol- 
lowed, and  the  Democratic  party  would  have  disintegrated.1 

One  result  of  the  Charleston  convention  was  to  strengthen  the 
feeling  in  favor  of  Douglas  in  North  Carolina.  Four  of  the  ten  elec- 
tors expressed  themselves  favorable  to  his  nomination  between  the 
Charleston  and  the  Baltimore  conventions,  while  the  Standard  was 
outspoken  for  him.2  Mr.  Douglas  also  had  personal  ties  with  leading 
Democrats  of  the  State.3  But  the  events  at  Baltimore  checked  the 
Douglas  sentiment.  All  of  the  North  Carolina  delegates  except  three 
withdrew  from  the  convention,  and  only  one  of  these  took  any  part 
in  its  further  work.  Still,  there  was  some  hope  for  Douglas.  Two  of 
the  electors  resigned  from  the  Breckinridge  ticket  and  accepted  simi- 
lar positions  on  the  Douglas  ticket.  There  was  also  a  demand,  evi- 
dently by  the  friends  of  Douglas,  that  a  party  convention  be  called 
in  the  State  to  decide  for  whom  the  electors  should  vote.4  The  State 
executive  committee  met  to  consider  this  demand,  but  decided  not 
to  call  the  convention.5  Thereupon  the  Standard  proposed  that  the 
electors  vote  for  either  Breckinridge  or  Douglas,  according  to  the 

1  Standard,  May  9,  1860;  for  experiences  of  Mr.  Holden  at  Charleston,  see  also  "Papers  of  the  Trinity 
College  Historical  Society,"  series  III,  pp.  59-62. 

2  These  electors  were  A.  M.  Scales,  J.  R.  McLean,  Thomas  W.  Keen,  and  Ed.  G.  Haywood.    Standard, 
June  13,  1860  (account  of  meeting  in  Rockingham  County). 

a  Mr.  Douglas's  wife  by  his  first  marriage  was  Miss  Martin,  a  member  of  a  North  Carolina  family  very 
prominent  in  State  politics. 
«  Thomas  W.  Keen  and  Henry  Miller  were  the  electors  who  resigned,  Standard,  passim. 
&  Standard,  July  11, 1860. 


NORTH   CAROLINA  ON   THE  EVE   OF   SECESSION.  177 

chances  of  either  to  defeat  Lincoln.1  But  as  time  passed  the  feeling 
grew  that  Breckinridge  was  the  stronger  of  the  two  Democratic  candi- 
dates. Thereupon  a  group  of  Douglas  men  called  a  State  convention 
at  Raleigh,  put  up  electors,  and  started  a  campaign  newspaper.2 
Forced  to  decide  between  Douglas  and  Breckinridge,  the  Standard 
turned  to  the  latter.  The  Douglas  campaign  was  ineffective,  his  vote 
in  the  State  less  than  3,000. 

In  contrast  to  the  division  and  uncertainty  among  the  Democrats 
was  the  sense  of  patriotism  among  the  Whigs.  The  appeal  to  the 
Union  and  the  Constitution  struck  a  responsive  chord  among  the 
people,  and  the  large  Whig  vote  in  the  State  elections  was  an  en- 
couragement to  all  genuine  lovers  of  the  Union.  The  principal  fea- 
ture of  the  Whig  campaign  was  a  series  of  mass  meetings  in  October. 
The  greatest  of  these  was  held  in  Salisbury.  It  was  attended  by 
delegates  from  all  sections  of  the  State.  The  number  of  people  in 
the  mammoth  procession  was  3,600,  while  the  total  attendance  was 
estimated  at  6,000  or  8,000.  The  chief  address  was  by  Zebulon  B. 
Vance,  who  held  the  audience  spellbound  by  his  oratory  for  two 
hours  during  a  cold,  dismal  rain.3  The  prevailing  sentiment  was  to 
rebuke  the  seceders  of  the  South  and  the  abolitionists  of  the  North, 
and  to  rally  in  one  great  effort  to  save  the  Union  and  the  Constitution. 

As  the  election  approached  the  motives  which  shaped  the  cast  of 
ballots  were  conflicting.  The  Whig  appeal  to  the  Union  and  the  Con- 
stitution found  a  response  in  the  conservatism  of  the  people  and  was 
in  line  with  the  trend  away  from  sectional  issues  to  domestic  problems. 
On  the  other  hand,  to  defeat  Lincoln  seemed  imperative  to  preserve 
the  dignity,  if  not  the  rights,  of  the  South;  and  for  this  duty  Breckin- 
ridge was  undoubtedly  the  most  promising  candidate.  The  results 
showed  a  Democratic  majority  very  similar  to  that  in  the  State  elec- 
tion; but  the  majority  of  Breckinridge  over  both  Bell  and  Douglas 
was  only  848.4  Since  many  Union  Democrats  cast  their  votes  for 
Breckinridge  as  the  only  hope  of  defeating  Lincoln,  his  small  major- 
ity was  really  a  rebuke  to  the  radical  State-rights  influences  which 
had  nominated  him.  That  rebuke  to  radicalism  was  repeated  in 
February,  1861,  when  in  an  election  for  a  convention  on  Federal  rela- 
tions, the  people  chose  a  majority  of  Union  delegates  and  also  voted 
that  the  convention  should  not  meet.  Not  until  President  Lincoln's 
requisition  on  the  State  for  troops  after  the  firing  on  Fort  Sumter 
did  secession  triumph  in  North  Carolina;  and  then  because  the  only 
alternative  was  that  of  fighting  against  the  South. 

i  Standard,  July  18, 1860. 

3  Robert  P.  Dick  was  the  leader  of  this  movement.     The  meeting  was  held  on  August  30.    The  cam- 
paign paper  was  called  The  National  Democrat.    Its  editor  was  Quenten  Busbee. 
a  Raleigh  Register,  Oct.  17, 1860. 
*  Breckinridge,  48,539;  Bell,  44,990;  Douglas,  2,701. 

98181°— 12 12 


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This  book  may  be  kept  out  one  month  unless  a  recall 
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Carolina  Collection  (in  Wilson  Library)  for  renewal. 


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